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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, and H. ROGER
BOYER dba THE BOYER COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
Case No. 14442
E. KEITH LIGNELL and
BURTON M. TODD,
Defendants and
Respondents,

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

INTRODUCTION

This Reply Brief is directed to the Brief filed herein
by the defendants-respondents, E. Keith Lignell (f,LignelltT) and
Burton M. Todd ("Todd").

This Reply Brief will address, in turn,

Points I through VI of the Brief of defendants-respondents.

In

conjunction with that discussion, various of the statements contained in the Statement of Facts of defendants-respondents will
be addressed and refuted as being contrary to or without support
in the record.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING WITHOUT MODIFICATION THE FINDINGS OF
FACT PREPARED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS AND, AT BEST,, SUCH FINDINGS ARE ENTITLED TO LITTLE WEIGHT,
In Point I of plaintiffs-appellants' opening Brief,
the findings of the trial court are challenged as having been
prepared by counsel for the prevailing party and mechanically
adopted without modification by the trial court.

Defendants ar-

gue that those findings are nevertheless entitled to the presumption of validity ordinarily attaching to a trial courtf s
findings for three reasons:

(1) The preparation by the pre-

vailing party of proposed findings "is in accord with the long
established custom of the court."

[Brief of Defendants-Respon-

dents, P. 10]. (2) Because plaintiffs submitted objections
and proposed amendments to the findings in question, the trial
court twice considered the propriety of those findings; and

(3)

There is no conflict between the court?s Memorandum Decision
and counsel's proposed findings. All of the foregoing "reasons"
are facially unmeritorious and unresponsive to the arguments
contained in Point I of plaintiffs-appellantsf opening Brief.
The first ground offered by defendants is the practice
of trial courts to request proposed findings from the prevailing party, a practice which, in the imperfect world in which we
i

all function,

cannot seriously be challenged.

That practice,

1/ Plaintiffs recognize that our overworked trial bench cannot
reasonably be expected to prepare all findings and conclusions
without the assistance of counsel.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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\

however, is not challenged by plaintiffs.

That the trial court

had two opportunities to consider counsel's findings likewise is
irrelevant.

But irrespective of the number of opportunities

afforded a court to make its own findings, the failure to utilize those opportunities yields the same result -- the findings
are those of counsel and not the court.

Finally, the absence

of conflict between the court's Memorandum Decision and counsel's findings is immaterial.

Carried to its logical conclu-

sion, this argument would permit counsel to draft and the trial
court to adopt any and all findings not inconsistent with the
court's ruling, which is often no more than "judgment for defendants ."
A comparison of the findings entered below and the
Memorandum Decision reveals that of the contents of the latter,
all favorable material was included and all unfavorable material
was excluded in the findings. For example, although the court
noted that "it has long been the practice of the Real Estate
Division of the Department of Business Regulation not to license
2
corporations as brokers," the findings contain no such recognition.

Similarly, the findings prepared by counsel and en-

tered without modification by the trial court embody the findings necessary to sustain virtually all of defendants' affirmative defenses, notwithstanding that the court's Memorandum
decision made mention of almost none of them.

In short, de-

fendants' counsel prepared slanted findings which, although
not inconsistent with the Memorandum Decision, were in every

2/

Memorandum Decision, R. 187.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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material respect favorable to defendants. Whereas the findings
in question are a credit to the advocacy of counsel for defendants, the lower court's mechanical adoption of the same stands
at odds with the trial court's duty, under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, to find the facts for this Court's review.
To assume that the lower court agreed in each and every
detail with the twenty-two findings and conclusions drafted by
counsel stretches the imagination beyond the breaking point. For
this Court to endow such mechanically adopted findings with the
presumption of validity properly attaching to the findings of a
court is to deprive plaintiffs of a meaningful review by this
Court.
POINT II
THE BOYER COMPANY WAS DULY LICENSED AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER.
The trial court held that The Boyer Company could not
recover because it was not properly licensed as a real estate
broker pursuant to Section 61-2-1, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. 1968).
Significantly, however, the lower court recognized "that it has
long been the practice of the Real Estate Division of the Department of Business Regulation not to license corporations as
brokers.ff

Memorandum Decision, R. 186-87.

Both in their State-

ment of Facts and in Point II of their Argument, defendants
distort the facts and omit critical facts concerning this issue.
Defendants assert that The Boyer Company neither applied for nor held a real estate broker's license at any time
material to this case.

[Appellants' Brief, p. 2.]. Further,

defendants assert that the broker's license issued in 1972 was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

issued only to Boyer, the individual,
14.]

[Appellants* Brief at p.

Defendants conveniently overlook the fact that Boyerfs ap-

plication for a broker's license dated August 18, 1972 indicated
that the "Company Name" was "The Boyer Company."
page 2.]

[Exhibit 8-P,

Also overlooked is the fact that the license issued

pursuant to that application was issued to "H. Roger Boyer d/b/a
The Boyer Company."

[Exhibit 8-P, page 6.]

Further ignored is

the fact that the Real Estate Broker's Record maintained by the
Division of Real Estate with respect to the subject license indicated the name of the broker to be "The Boyer Company." That
same Record was maintained by the Division of Real Estate continuously between the issuance of the license in December, 1972
until the commencement of this action.

[Exhibit 8-P, p. 8].

Perhaps most significantly, however, the Division's own computer
3
master file records as of October 24, 1973 showed a broker's
license to be issued to H. Roger Boyer under the "company name"
of "Boyer Co., The."

[Exhibit 8-P, p. 13.]

Mr. Stephen J. Francis, Director of the Real Estate
Division, was examined extensively concerning Exhibit 8-P.

Mr.

Francis testified again and again that the method by which H.
Roger Boyer dba The Boyer Company was licensed as evidenced by
Exhibit 8-P was followwed as a practice by the Department with
respect to corporations.

[T. 279-282].

Indeed, Mr. Francis

testified that on October 28, 1973, his office regarded The
Boyer Company as being licensed as a broker.

[T. 287.]

3/ The transactions here at issue occurred during October and
November, 1973.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendants offer two Exhibits to demonstrate that the
Division of Real Estate distinguished between individual and
corporate licenses, Exhibits 23-D and 24-D.
p. 15.]

[Appellants1 Brief,

Exhibit 23-D was withdrawn by defendants and was never

offered into evidence.

[T. 296.]

Exhibit 24-D was located in

the files of the Department by the son of counsel for defendants,
Mr. Tanner.

[T. 293-94.]

In introducing that Exhibit, Mr.

Tanner stipulated that Exhibit 24-D was not introduced as evidence of a general practice of the Department, but only as evidence of the single licensing occasion evidenced by the document.

[T, 295.] When examined concerning Exhibit 24-D, which

was offered by defendants as a "genuine" corporate broker's
license, Mr. Francis testified that the subject license was issued to an individual and did not differ from the license issued
to H. Roger Boyer dba The Boyer Company.

[T. 297-99.]

In summary, both the lower court in its Memorandum Decision and the evidence at trial clearly established
the Division in 1973 did not license corporations,

(1) that
(2) that

a corporation could act as a broker when associated with a duly
licensed individual, and

(3) that both H. Roger Boyer and The

Boyer Company were duly licensed as brokers pursuant to the pratices of the Division in October and November, 1973.
Mr. Francis, defendants in their Brief (p. 15), and
the lower court in its Memorandum Decision recognized that The
Boyer Company was licensed as a broker pursuant to the practices
of the Division of Real Estate.

Plaintiffs submit that those

practices are consistent with the applicable statutory provisions.

[See Appellants' opening Brief, pp. 17-22.] However,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the unlikely event that this Court determines that the Division incorrectly interpreted those statutes, The Boyer Company
cannot properly be penalized for following the practices of the
Division of Real Estate, the body charged with administering
those statutes. Further, Todd and Lignell cannot properly complain of any licensing deficiency with respect to The Boyer Company, since they dealt only with H. Roger Boyer, admittedly a
duly licensed broker.

Finally, any licensing deficiency with

respect to The Boyer Company cannot prevent recovery by H. Roger
Boyer who is acknowledged to have been a duly licensed broker
[Finding No. 3, R. 194.]
POINT III
TODD AND LIGNELL THROUGH THEIR BAD FAITH REFUSAL TO COOPERATE
AND CONCLUDE THE SALE, PREVENTED THE CONSUMMATION OF THE SALE,
AND PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR COMMISSION.
In their Brief, under Point III, defendants press three
erroneous factual conclusions that they contend preclude recovery by plaintiffs.

Each will be considered in turn.

A.
Defendants did not act in good faith in their
dealings with plaintiffs and did not make reasonable efforts to
consummate the sale.
Defendants first claim that the Osmond Brothers' admitted acceptance of Todd and Lignell's "counteroffer" was not
communicated to them.

[Respondents' Brief, p. 23.] Defendants'

4/ For purposes of this Reply Brief, Todd and Lignell's "counteroffer" will be treated as the doctors' deletion of the leaseback
provision contained in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase submitted by the Osmond Brothers. See Appellants'
opening Brief, p. 6.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

argument consists only of a distortion of the testimony of Lew
Costley.

Defendants reason that because Costley testified that

he discussed the leaseback deletion "within a week or ten days"
(T. 119) after a date that Costley could not pinpoint (T. 118),
Boyer could not have communicated the Osmond Brothersf acceptance to Todd on October 15, The distortion advanced by defendants is obvious:

(1) Costley could not pinpoint the date on

which he received the modified offer;

(2) Costley indicated

that he discussed the same with Callister within a week or ten
days after receiving the document [not "at least a week" as
defendants incorrectly suggest at page 23 of their Brief]; and
(3) Todd himself acknowledges having had a conversation with
Boyer in which Boyer at least indicated that the deletion "could
be worked out."

[T, 21,]

The various witnesses' testimony con-

cerning the Osmond Brothers1 verbal acceptance of the counteroffer can be fairly summarized as follows:
(i) Callister, after being advised of the deletion,
authorized Boyer to enter into and close the agreement as modified by Todd and Lignell.

[T. 183-84, Callister Depo.

pp. 19-

22.]
(ii) Costlev. after discussing the modification with
Callister, decided that the Osmond Brothers would enter into the
agreement as modified by Todd and Lignell.

[T. 118-21.]

(iii) Boyer testified that he advised Todd that the
agreement as modified was accepted by the Osmond Brothers.
184-85.]
(iv) Todd acknowledged that Boyer told him that the
modified agreement "could be worked out."

[T. 21-23.]

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[T.

Perhaps most persuasively, the parties thereafter began working
towards a closing, with the Osmond Brothers liquidating assets
to procure the down payment, Boyer procuring a title insurance
policy, and Todd speaking with MacLeod concerning arrangement of
the Northwestern mortgage,

[Appellants1 opening Brief, p. 7-8.]

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that there exists little, if any,
doubt on the record that Boyer communicated the Osmond Brothersf
acceptance of the counteroffer to Todd,

Even the lower court's

findings are not inconsistent with this conclusion -- the findings below state only that the Osmond Brothers did not accept
the counteroffer Min a legally binding fashion11

[Finding 11,

R. 195.]
Defendants next claim that Todd diligently sought to
procure the consent of Northwestern Mutual to an assumption of
that company's mortgage by the Osmond Brothers.
Brief at pp. 23-28.]

[Respondents'

The following, all of which is established

without reliance on any testimony of Boyer and most of which is
established out of Todd's own mouth, leaves no question that
Todd refused to cooperate toward the assumption that was essential to a consummated sale:
(i) Todd never made any concrete proposal to Northwestern concerning the Osmond Brothers' proposed assumption [T.
79, Todd testifying; MacLeod Depo. pp. 32-35.]
(ii) Todd never even advised Northwestern that he and
Lignell had agreed to sell the Shaughnessy Apartments to the Osmond Brothers.

[T. 156, Todd testifying.]

(iii) Although Boyer specifically requested that Todd
seek in writing the consent of Northwestern to assumption, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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even though Todd promised to write such a letter, Todd never
wrote the letter.

[T. 50-51, Todd testifying.]

When Todd

sought a modification of his and Lignellfs loan relationship
with Northwestern for their own account, however, he predictably
did so in writing.

[T. 57, Todd testifying; Exhibit 12-P.]

(iv) MacLeod could not recall ToddTs ever having requested that the Osmond Brothers be permitted to assume the
Northwestern loan.

[MacLeod Depo. pp. 32, 25, 41,]

(v) Todd at trial acknowledged that Boyer advised him
that the Osmond Brothers were willing to prepay some interest
and increase the interest rate of the loan to induce Northwestern
to permit the assumption, but Todd never advised MacLeod of those
facts.

[T. 52-53, Todd testifying.]
(vi) Todd testified that during his first telephone

conversation with MacLeod, he indicated that he and Lignell
really were not interested in obtaining Northwestern's permission allowing the Osmond Brothers' assumption.

[T. 155, Todd

testifying.]
(vii) During the s ame time that Todd was supposedly
attempting to arrange the Osmond Brothers1 assumption, Todd
was also attempting to arrange a refinancing of the Shaughnessy
Apartments through Northwestern for his and Lignellrs own account !

[T. 24-25, 52-56, Todd testifying; Todd Depo. pp. 38-

39.]
(viii) MacLeod indicated that in each conversation
with Todd, he left Todd with the initiative, and awaited a concrete proposal from Todd, which never came.

[MacLeod Depo, pp.

32-35.]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(ix) On November 19, 1973, Todd sent Boyer a letter
stating that he and Lignell had decided ufor various reasons, not
to sell the Shaughnessy Apartments,"

[Exhibit 5-P.]

Todd in

that same letter stated that he had so indicated to Boyer !fover
the past several weeks.11 During that same past several weeks,
Todd would now have the Court believe that he was diligently
seeking to consummate the sale,
(x) Todd testified that at least a "minor reason" in
his decision not to sell the property was a potential adverse
tax consequence of such sale in the amount of $145,000.00 [T.
160; Todd testifying; Todd Depo. pp. 44-45.]

At no time did

Todd ever claim that the readiness, willingness, or ability of
the Osmond Brothers to purchase the property ever played any
role in the decision not to sell.
As the foregoing makes clear, Todd never seriously attempted to arrange the essential assumption by Northwestern and
decided not to sell the property in the face of a ready, willing,
and able buyer. We submit that Todd's attempt to refinance the
Shaughnessy for his and Lignellfs own account while he was supposedly attempting to effect another arrangement for the Osmond
Brothers is sufficient to establish his patent lack of good
faith.

Defendants cannot take refuge in any claim of disputed

testimony resolved by the court against plaintiffs, for the
testimony upon which plaintiffs' rely is that of Todd himself.
B.

The prospective buyers were ready, willing, and

able.
At pages 30-31 of their Brief, defendants suggest
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(1)

that Northwestern would not approve the Osmond Brothers' assumption absent some incentive to Northwestern and

(2) that MacLeod

did not have final authority to approve an assumption.

It is

true that MacLeod indicated that, in negotiations with Todd, he
would have sought some improvement in Northwestern's loan position.

[MacLeod Depo. p. 27,] MacLeod indicated, however, that

if Todd had seriously requested an assumption by the Osmond Brothers , the same would have been granted without any modification
or incentive to Northwestern.

[MacLeod Depo. pp. 40-41.]

Even

if MacLeod had requested additional consideration in return for
the assumption, the Osmond Brothers stood ready to prepay some
interest and increase the loan interest rate.
testifying.]

[T. 52-53, Todd

Todd, however, never advised MacLeod of that fact.

[T. 52-53, Todd testifying.]

Todd is in no position now to ar-

gue that an assumption could not have been arranged absent additional consideration when he admits that he never advised
Northwestern of the additional consideration that the Osmond
Brothers were ready, willing, and able to provide.
Defendants weakly suggest that in any event, MacLeod
had no authority to permit the assumption.

MacLeod, who was the

Regional Manager of the Mortgage Loan Department of Northwestern,
was not an impotent functionary.

[MacLeod Depo, pp. 2-3.]

Mac

Leod testified that he had reasonable success in having his recommendations approved, [MacLeod Depo. p. 39] and that pragmatically, he would have recommended the Osmond Brothers' assumption lf[a]nd as to its being approved, going back to your earlier
question as to what is my success ratio, my company is a pragmatic company,ff

[MacLeod Depo, p. 70.] Most importantly, however,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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approval of MacLeod's recommendation was never sought because
Todd never seriously sought such approval.

[MacLeod Depo. pp.

32-35.]
C.

The Offer was not Impossible to Perform.

At pages 31 to 34 of their Brief, defendants argue that
the unwillingness of Northwestern to remove Todd and Lignell!s
dental building from the mortgage covering that building as well
as the Shaughnessy rendered a sale impossible or at least constituted a mutual mistake of fact between the parties. Those
arguments are legally and factually untenable.

First, neither

impossibility of performance nor mutual mistake was pleaded by
defendants with respect to this subject.
166-171.]
dure.

[Amended Answer, R.

See Rules 8(c) and 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-

Further, even the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law drafted by defendants! counsel make no mention of such impossibility or mistake.
Most significantly, however, the facts adduced at trial
do not support those belated arguments. First, the Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase contained no provision requiring severance of the dental building from the mortgage of
Northwestern.

[Exhibit 2-P.]

Such severance was therefore

clearly not something upon which Todd and Lignell could insist.
Second, Todd never even mentioned to Boyer prior to the doctors1
refusal to sell that severance of the dental building was in
any way a problem.

[T. 203-04.]

point is uncontroverted.

Boyerfs testimony on this

Hence, the Osmond Brothers were never

given an opportunity by Todd to resolve this difficulty, if it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was a difficulty.

Third, Todd is in no position now to claim

that severance of the dental building was a problem, for Todd on
three separate occasions testified that neither he nor MacLeod
regarded it as a problem.
D.

[T. 30-31, 42, 49-50, Todd testifying.]

Plaintiffs1 Authorities are Applicable Here.

At pages 35 to 39 of their Brief, defendants assert
that because the listing letter [Exhibit 1-P] conditioned Boyerfs
commission on a consummated sale, the authorities offered by
plaintiffs are inapposite.

That argument, even if meritorious,

would have no effect upon The Boyer Company's right to recover
pursuant to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase [Exhibit 2-P], for the latter was not conditioned on a consummated
sale.
Plaintiffs invite the Court to review Hoyt v. Wasatch
Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927 (1953).
dants recognize,

There as defen-

the Court considered whether a broker could

recover pursuant to a special listing contract notwithstanding

5/ Defendants argue at page 39 of their Brief that the consummated sale requirement was to carry through to the Earnest Money
Agreement, an argument that is directly contrary to the court's
finding number 12 (R. 195) that with respect to the Earnest Money
Agreement, "no verbal statement made by anyone relative to this
transaction shall be construed to be a part of this transaction
unless incorporated in writing herein." Defendants1 falsely assert that plaintiffs' counsel stipulated that the consummated
sale provision of the listing letter was intended to carry through
to the Earnest Money Agreement. We invite the Court to make its
own judgment as to what counsel for Boyer stipulated. [T. 44.]
Finally, it must be remembered that Boyer the individual entered
into the Earnest Money Agreement. As defendants point out at
page 29 of their Brief, the distinction between the individual
and corporation should be recognized.
£/

Defendants1 Brief at p. 37.
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that a sale was not consummated.

The Court held that the broker

could recover because the seller's refusal to cooperate towards
a sale excused that condition to payment of the broker's commission.

1 Utah 2d at 14-15, 261 P.2d at 930. Defendants' at-

tempt to distinguish Hoyt by claiming, contrary to the fact,
that in Hoyt a binding contract was entered into between buyer
and seller.

In Hoyt, the parties entered into an agreement which

did not prescribe payment terms and recited "terms and conditions
* * * subject to adjustment agreeable to the parties." After
further negotiations, the parties did come to an oral agreement
as to such terms. By established law and defendants' own theory,
the preliminary and oral nature of the agreement in Hoyt rendered it unenforceable.

In Hoyt, as just noted, the parties en-

tered into an agreement that left payment terms to future agreement.

As defendants note at page 42 of their Brief,

the ab-

sence of agreement as to all terms precluded a binding contract.
R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817
(1952); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962).
As was the case here, however, the parties in Hoyt entered into
a subsequent oral agreement concerning the open terms. Here,
the Court is presented with a written offer and counteroffer
and an oral acceptance.

Hoyt cannot be distinguished.

As re-

cently as December, 1976, this Court reaffirmed the Hoyt rule
that under a special listing agreement, if "the sale is not
completed because of lack of cooperation or obstruction by the
listor . . ., the agent is nevertheless entitled to his commission."

Davis v. Heath Development Co., 558 P.2d 495, 496 (Utah

1976).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT IV
DEFENDANTS COUNTEROFFER WAS ACCEPTED BY THE OSMOND BROTHERS
At pages 40 to 41 of their Brief, defendants claim
that the doctorsf counteroffer was never accepted by the Osmond
Brothers.

As noted above, it is not disputed that the Osmond

Brothers instructed Boyer to accept the counteroffer and the
evidence is overwhelming that Boyer advised Todd of that acceptance.

See pages 8-9, supra.
Defendants next suggest that the acceptance was in-

effective because it occurred more than one day after the counteroffer.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase did

provide that acceptance of the offer by the Osmond Brothers was
conditioned on acceptance within one day.

There is no evidence

that the doctors' counteroffer was so conditioned.

[Exhibit 2-

P.]
The fact that the Osmond Brothersf acceptance was not
in writing is immaterial for, as indicated below, a written
contract is not required - - a ready, willing, and able purchaser
was the only prerequisite to the brokers1 commission.
Defendants next incredibly argue that there is no
evidence that Boyer had authority to accept the counteroffer
on behalf of the Osmond Brothers.

To quote defendants, ff[d]ur-

ing all times relevant to this matter, Boyer was the agent for
the Osmond Brothers and was acting for and on their behalf in
the proposed purchase.
Depo. pp. 44-45)ff

(Finding No. 3, R. 94, T, 318, Callister
<

[Respondents' Brief at p. 3.]

Callister and

Costley testified without contradiction that they instructed
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Boyer to accept the doctors1 counteroffer.

[Callister Depo.

pp. 19-22; T. 118-21,]
POINT V
LACK OF AN "ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT" DOES NOT PRECLUDE
PLAINTIFFS1 RECOVERY
Defendants1 argument at pages 42 to 44 of their Brief
misconceives plaintiffs1 theory.

Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1

Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927 (1953), upon which plaintiffs rely,
stands for the following propositions:
1.

A broker under a special listing agreement may

recover his commission notwithstanding the absence of a consummated sale or enforceable contract to sell if

(a) he produces

a ready, willing, and able purchaser who orally agrees to purchase the subject property, and

(b) the seller refuses to co-

operate towards the consummation of a sale.
2.

A broker under "the usual printed form Earnest

Money Receipt and Agreement" may recover absent an enforceable
written agreement between buyer and seller if the broker produces a ready, willing, and able purchaser who orally agrees to
purchase the subject property.
H. Roger Boyer is entitled to recovery under the first
proposition; The Boyer Company is entitled to recover under the
second proposition.

Hoyt, which dealt with a special listing

letter and Earnest Money Agreement in substance identical to
those here presented, cannot be distinguished from the facts
here presented.

Hoyt held that the broker was entitled to his

commission under both the special listing agreement and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Earnest Money Agreement absent a written, enforceable contract
to convey,
POINT VI
PLAINTIFFS' CONDUCT ENTITLES THEM TO THEIR COMMISSION
Defendants at pages 44 to 46 apparently argue that
Boyer did not work hard enough to close the sale.

We are un-

aware of, and defendants do not cite, any authority that supports
this theory.

Boyer produced a purchaser who was both willing

and able, even eager, to purchase a million dollar building.
Had defendants been able to accomplish this simple task, they
surely would not have engaged Boyer.

Defendants suggest that

Boyer should have called MacLeod more frequently notwithstanding
that the testimony is uncontroverted that MacLeod would talk
only to Todd and not to Boyer (MacLeod Depo. pp. 8, 10-11, 6061, 64-65, 71) and indeed complained to Todd that Boyer had
called him (T. 75, Todd testifying).

Defendants' other feeble

assertions, most of which have no support in the record, require
no comment.

Boyerfs testimony is uncontroverted that, in addi-

tion to conveying communications between buyer and seller and
attempting unsuccessfully to communicate with MacLeod, Boyer
performed financial analyses concerning the property, met with
the buyers and sellers at the property, prepared a written offer for the buyers, handled the earnest money deposited by the
buyers, hand carried first the offer and later the counteroffer
from Salt Lake City to Costley in Ogden, procured a preliminary
title insurance binder, met with the sellers to discuss potential
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incentives to Northwestern, and a host of other activities conducive to a closing.

[T. 177-190,]

If Boyer did not work hard

enough to earn plaintiffs1 commission, every broker in the State
of Utah would be a charge of the States' welfare system.

In any

event, the broker's obligation is to procure a purchaser, not
work hard enough to satisfy his sellers,
CONCLUSION
Hoyt is virtually identical, legally and factually, to
the facts here presented.

Under Hoyt, plaintiffs are entitled

to recover their commission.

The lower court must be reversed.
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